Rh is kind of the canonical distro, though, as much as there is such a thing. I’m surprised this was never upstreamed.
miduil 4 hours ago [-]
This vulnerability was discovered by Johan Carlsson and we were informed by GitLab on 2026-11-12.
Initially we set 2026-11-25 for a coordinated disclosure;
due to the new Ruby2Shell bug GitLab had to update earlier
and thus we also disclosed the GPGME bug on 2026-11-20.
I guess pretty important for GitLab since it supports signed commits, code execution in that path is pretty bad.
It's a double free bug, not an RCE chain. Are these vulnerability reports intentionally overstated?
InsidiousWombat 3 minutes ago [-]
Yes, the actual post just implies possibility
> Exploiting this bug to mount an Remote Code Execution attack (RCE) can't
be ruled out.
gdgghhhhh 2 hours ago [-]
Sending somebody a signed message and trigger a double free is a prime example for RCE
kuroguro 2 hours ago [-]
RCE might be possible, you still need to overlay something useful in the freed memory and bypass ASLR.
Deeg9rie9usi 2 hours ago [-]
The mail says "Exploiting this bug to mount an Remote Code Execution attack (RCE) can't be ruled out.".
They didn't write this just for fun. gnupg usually downplays security issues.
kuroguro 1 hours ago [-]
I'd say that is as accurate as they can be. Since it's a library and it's a heap bug they have no idea how a particular application will be affected.
It's still a critical bug, just would not call it a prime example of rce.
wavemode 36 minutes ago [-]
I mean, the blame is moreso on the title of this HackerNews submission. "RCE can't be ruled out" is not equivalent to "RCE in Gnupg"
Sopel 1 hours ago [-]
it can't be ruled out that an RCE exists in other parts of this software either
gsich 2 hours ago [-]
poc needed.
Deeg9rie9usi 2 hours ago [-]
IMHO, these days any kind of UB has to be considered exploitable by an LLM.
The times of debating whether something is exploitable or not are over.
gsich 2 hours ago [-]
We are having this debate right now. So it's far from over. Without PoC it's unclear if it's RCE or just overhyped bullshit. See PHP or Nginx "RCE" which required specific crafted settings for it to even work. A video is not a "PoC".
If you believe an LLM can generate an exploit for this - feel free to post one.
o_-_o 1 hours ago [-]
I agree PoC's should be a requirement for all this exploits.
InsidiousWombat 1 minutes ago [-]
at the very least should be criteria for assigning "high", CVE spam is annoying enough as it is
usr1106 2 hours ago [-]
What are practical attack vectors for Linux workstations and servers?
The masses of internet users don't know what GPG is. I'd caim the majority of software developers don't have a GPG key and never explicitly verify any signature.
But packages of many distros are verified using GPG. Is the vulnerable component involved or not?
kodoman 18 minutes ago [-]
> But packages of many distros are verified using GPG. Is the vulnerable component involved or not?
Debian uses it last time I was on a Debian system And I think all Debian based distros that don't modify apt will essentially use GPG to verify the packages as well.
I think it's one of the those programs that pop up in a lot of different things. Personally I use it a fair amount and even use the Symmetric encryption features for some files and for personal password management.
I do think developer are moving away from it thought I agree (and for various reasons that are good).
OJFord 2 hours ago [-]
Potentially package update/installation? A lot of people use gpg without knowing it.
It's specifically in 'GPGME' though, so more limited scope I think.
capitol_ 1 hours ago [-]
A lot of those places have switched out the gnupg PGP implementation with sequoia-openpgp.
usr1106 2 hours ago [-]
That was my question. Where is gpgme used? Any "unexpected" places?
lazka 1 hours ago [-]
Arch Linux uses gpgme to verify downloaded packages (and optionally, package databases) for example.
2 hours ago [-]
gdgghhhhh 2 hours ago [-]
PGP mail?
Geezus_42 2 hours ago [-]
Which almost no one uses.
gdgghhhhh 2 hours ago [-]
Wrong bubble ;-)
Geezus_42 1 hours ago [-]
If only people in a certain bubble use it, then almost no one actually uses it.
kodoman 23 minutes ago [-]
> no one actually uses it.
A lot of people use it especially certain high value targets on darknet drug markets who might miss this.
A lot of projects do still use it for signing projects though many have opted for simpler solutions (or unfortunately no signing).
I think Debian still uses it (not sure about ubuntu) in apt.
Geezus_42 16 minutes ago [-]
Darknet drug dealers are still an extreme minority of people. You still have not negated my statement.
Sure, GPG gets used for signing packages and that COULD potentially lead to a supply chain attack IF this is not quickly patched.
mmsc 2 hours ago [-]
The vulnerability is in GpgME (the library), not GnuTLS (the library).
usr1106 1 hours ago [-]
Editorialized submission title to be better bait.
The correct title is: GnuPG Security Advisory for GPGME
g-b-r 30 minutes ago [-]
Which wouldn't tell us anything before checking the link
fn-mote 16 minutes ago [-]
The current title is "RCE in Gnupg". A more appropriate title would be "Double free produces posible RCE in GnuPG". The non-editorialized title would also be better because it does not claim there is an RCE that is not known to exist.
"Probable RCE in GnuPG clients" would be appropriate.
When someone posts a Claude POC, then the situation is different.
g-b-r 13 minutes ago [-]
Alright, possible RCE would be fair
fock 26 minutes ago [-]
so essentially look at the key before? (and hope your program does not have another RCE...)
IshKebab 1 hours ago [-]
Luckily nobody uses it!
Velocifyer 1 hours ago [-]
This is a reminder that Seqouia-PGP exists, and its 'sq' CLI is way more intuitive.
legsrunny 4 hours ago [-]
more or less than 0 impacted systems?
Rendered at 14:42:25 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) with Vercel.
You can find the GitLab Omnibus related patch here: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/omnibus-gitlab/-/commit/279ac3...
> Exploiting this bug to mount an Remote Code Execution attack (RCE) can't be ruled out.
It's still a critical bug, just would not call it a prime example of rce.
If you believe an LLM can generate an exploit for this - feel free to post one.
The masses of internet users don't know what GPG is. I'd caim the majority of software developers don't have a GPG key and never explicitly verify any signature.
But packages of many distros are verified using GPG. Is the vulnerable component involved or not?
Debian uses it last time I was on a Debian system And I think all Debian based distros that don't modify apt will essentially use GPG to verify the packages as well.
I think it's one of the those programs that pop up in a lot of different things. Personally I use it a fair amount and even use the Symmetric encryption features for some files and for personal password management.
I do think developer are moving away from it thought I agree (and for various reasons that are good).
It's specifically in 'GPGME' though, so more limited scope I think.
A lot of people use it especially certain high value targets on darknet drug markets who might miss this.
A lot of projects do still use it for signing projects though many have opted for simpler solutions (or unfortunately no signing).
I think Debian still uses it (not sure about ubuntu) in apt.
Sure, GPG gets used for signing packages and that COULD potentially lead to a supply chain attack IF this is not quickly patched.
The correct title is: GnuPG Security Advisory for GPGME
"Probable RCE in GnuPG clients" would be appropriate.
When someone posts a Claude POC, then the situation is different.