The CVE associated with it (CVE-2026-85046) is already being exploited in the wild. If we put our thinking caps on, how much do you think this vulnerability is actually worth? How much do you think an organization like Google would spend on, for example, AI tokens or compute to detect this internally before it was found and exploited in the wild?
Ethical disclosure is a complicated topic, because researchers shouldn't hold bugs for ransom or demand high payment. But at the same time, if someone submits a critical issue like this, it makes sense to pay them what the bug's actually worth. Why should a researcher be effectively penalized for responsibly telling a vendor instead of selling the bug to a "research firm" or three-letter agency?
It's one thing if you're an open source project maintainer just trying to put something out to the community. The math is a lot different if you're Google.
tptacek 19 minutes ago [-]
If the vulnerability is already being exploited in the wild --- as in, it's a vector people already know about and are tracking --- it's possibly not worth much at all. Vulnerability valuations depend heavily on the lifespan of the vulnerability; payments on black market are tranched (explicitly or less explicitly, as with "maintenance payments") based on whether they're patched.
Further: a vulnerability is probably not worth that much either, even if it's a hypercapable vulnerability, because the grey market buys full enablement kits, not vulnerability information. People making 6 figures on vulnerabilities are selling fully enabled full chain exploit systems, not just intelligence about a sandbox escape.
CookieCrisp 2 hours ago [-]
While I agree 1000 is hilariously low for this, worth is hard to quantify. Do you pay what it could theoretically cost your company? the amount the top bidding bad actor would be willing to pay?
quotemstr 1 hours ago [-]
You let the market decide. Google could purchase the bugs on the same market blackhats do.
ajkjk 1 minutes ago [-]
we really do not want to engineer a system in which using bugs to make money is considered economically legitimate activity. It is still crime. The main reason to report bugs and get the bounties for doing so is still because it makes the world safer and healthier. The money is there to make is to incentivize the work of finding and reporting them -- not to outbid the bad actors.
bawolff 13 minutes ago [-]
Well, someone did decide to tell google about this in exchange for a thousand dollars (albeit unclear how much the money was the motivator). Doesn't that mean the market did decide in google's favour?
tptacek 17 minutes ago [-]
Google directly competes with the grey market for vulnerabilities. They are competitive in a bunch of different directions:
* They pay for vulnerabilities without reliable exploits (more for vulnerabilities that are demonstrably reliable).
* They don't require you to actually build a reliable exploit chain.
* They pay up front, not in tranches.
* They work with essentially all comers, unlike the grey market, where you're generally subcontracting to sell your first few.
asdfaoeu 14 minutes ago [-]
Blackhat markets will always be able to pay better. Selling to Google though you aren't chancing jail time.
quotemstr 4 minutes ago [-]
> Blackhat markets will always be able to pay better.
... than Google?
> Selling to Google though you aren't chancing jail time.
Why would you go to jail for selling a vulnerability? It's free speech.
jsw97 1 hours ago [-]
In the past I would have thought this would incentivize finding bugs that might never be found. However it is now clear that all bugs that can be found will be found. So this makes a ton of sense.
eru 57 minutes ago [-]
> In the past I would have thought this would incentivize finding bugs that might never be found.
Isn't that a good thing?
> However it is now clear that all bugs that can be found will be found. So this makes a ton of sense.
If Google can find all the bugs nowadays, presumably with AI, why still pay a bug bounty? At least by this logic, bug bounties make less sense now.
jsw97 53 minutes ago [-]
Sure they make sense — you need some incentive to drive the price to zero.
22 minutes ago [-]
teravor 1 hours ago [-]
ideally, an auction and the vendor or a government can bid against malicious actors (which can also be a government). hard to set up though.
eru 58 minutes ago [-]
What kind of auction would you like to run?
Remember that you can sell the same vulnerability to multiple people: it's software you can copy.
Barbing 40 minutes ago [-]
Maybe needs a Good-Guy-Buy-It-Now w/instant delivery at a fair price. (OK that’s kind of a threat—you’re running an auction and you have the price the corp has to pay to avoid the auction ending.)
$1k is so dumb and the fact we’re discussing auctions is proof (hello, Sundar, what you doing over there?).
Guess this will change after the next e.g. nationwide hospital ransomware by a hacker who publicly laments bounty rates, if the news cycle accommodates the story long enough.
27183 1 hours ago [-]
it seems unlikely google's lawyers would go for this
aeonik 59 minutes ago [-]
Maybe some code is so important and heavily trafficked it becomes a public works project, and various legs can bid for pieces of the project, line how all infrastructure works.
teravor 1 hours ago [-]
well that's why setting it up is hard, because you would want to do it in a way that what they want doesn't matter.
spacedoutman 13 minutes ago [-]
"because researchers shouldn't hold bugs for ransom or demand high payment"
Maybe they should now, not like anyone else cares about ethics anyway.
dataflow 16 minutes ago [-]
It sounds insultingly low, yeah. I'm trying to imagine why they would pay so little. The only two reasons I can think of are either (a) they were already aware of it and fixing it, and therefore the report didn't really change much, or (b) it requires an unusual configuration or otherwise rare opportunity to that makes it impractical to exploit most users. Really curious to see what the issue was whenever it gets made public.
solenoid0937 8 minutes ago [-]
(c) there are so many undiscovered vulnerabilities that it doesn't make sense for them to offer a decent payout
paxys 30 minutes ago [-]
There are plenty of people out there who find vulnerabilities and sell them to the highest bidder. Anyone is welcome to do it, including the researchers and hackers reporting them responsibly. There's no need to try and make a convoluted ethical justification. "I did this bad thing because you didn't pay me enough not to" doesn't work past the 6th grade.
bawolff 16 minutes ago [-]
> But at the same time, if someone submits a critical issue like this, it makes sense to pay them what the bug's actually worth.
I'd point out that part of the reason the grey and black market pays so well is because it is that type of market. You have to pay people extra to look past their morals and a risk premium against potential reputational and legal consequences.
That said, the gap is probably not just that.
s1artibartfast 9 minutes ago [-]
It seems like by definition it is.
Someone could sell it on the black market, sell it to Google, or just move on with their life and not sell it.
I don't know what this is worth on the black market, maybe I'd be scammed by even trying to sell it. Maybe I don't want to be a bad person. These are all things that go into the prices
arjie 23 minutes ago [-]
Interesting question, and how much should a user pay Google to fix the vulnerability? I suppose the smallest unit of currency less than the amount of effort they'd have to put in to mitigate it. A fully market economy of bug fixing here is an interesting idea, certainly, but if I'm being honest I actually don't want to pay Google a thousand dollars to fix security issues. In the limit, what would happen is that I end up with the competitor browser Elgoog Emorhc which fixes security issues for free, and pays very little for them, which is the status quo.
In the world where security issues are paid for entirely at market rate, it would also be very important to not use browsers by poor groups because they would be unable to pay for security reports on the market and consequently the browsers would be less secure.
Interesting idea, for sure, but I don't think it lands in a place I want to go since I neither desire stochastic payments nor desire that all browsers should be from large corporations.
38 minutes ago [-]
strictnein 24 minutes ago [-]
If this would have included a full RCE chain with Sandbox escape Google would have paid significantly more.
Having just a Sandbox RCE is neat, I've got some on my laptop currently, but it's just a piece of the puzzle.
computably 2 hours ago [-]
> How much do you think an organization like Google would spend on, for example, AI tokens or compute to detect this internally before it was found and exploited in the wild?
On average, probably not that much. What's the amortized cost of all testing, static analysis, and audit / code review, per "prevented potential bug"?
r_lee 44 minutes ago [-]
this is why again, researchers should just honestly sell these to vuln brokers instead of donating them to trillion dollar companies for nothing.
nothing will change until big tech can no longer rip off security researchers
Mtinie 33 minutes ago [-]
> Ethical disclosure is a complicated topic, because researchers shouldn't hold bugs for ransom or demand high payment.
Why not? Capitalism requires they maximize their value. These profitable companies lay bare at the altar, so they should understand the requirements of their god.
wilg 18 minutes ago [-]
Seems like it was worth $1000 to the researcher in question.
38 minutes ago [-]
esseph 2 hours ago [-]
The problem is they are being flooded with both fake AND real disclosures. Imagine if they tried to pay out $250,000 or more per bug? Would the cost be worth it? Maybe, but shareholders may not be pleased... Unless they viewed it as insurance against it being more financially sound for the finder to sell the exploit on the gray or black market instead...
Barbing 52 minutes ago [-]
Pre-flood, they didn’t pay more did they?
> viewed it as insurance
Of course. Beyond the ethics, the social obligation, sleeping well at night by compensating hardworking people fairly.
“We can’t pay more or we’d have to hire more human reviewers” should never be a massive company’s line of thinking.
rglover 1 hours ago [-]
They should just multiply a base rate against the severity level. Say the base rate is ranged so low-severity stuff is $500-1K base but high-severity stuff is $10K base. That would net a researcher ~$88K for this specific bug (8.8 severity).
r_lee 43 minutes ago [-]
it's such a drop in the bucket, it wouldn't make any difference
paulpauper 28 minutes ago [-]
The CVE associated with it (CVE-2026-85046) is already being exploited in the wild. If we put our thinking caps on, how much do you think this vulnerability is actually worth? How much do you think an organization like Google would spend on, for example, AI tokens or compute to detect this internally before it was found and exploited in the wild?
in the darkweb, due to crypto, a lot. there is where the $ is, whether it's stealing crypto directly or phishing developers.
publlus_enigma 1 hours ago [-]
Normalising running arbitrary code delivered over the internet (in the form of JavaScript and WASM), as a necessary condition for accessing most web pages may not have been one of the best decisions we have made.
tcdent 12 minutes ago [-]
V8 as a runtime goes far deeper than just webpages.
eru 56 minutes ago [-]
In the future we can ask that your JaveScript and Wasm comes with a proof of being benign.
I remember noticing this shift in nerd culture. In the early 2000s, it was common for people to say on places like Slashdot that they don't trust JavaScript and run their browser with it off. In the early 2010s, I noticed HN commenters thought this was insane, tinfoil hat type thinking.
bawolff 9 minutes ago [-]
In fairness, in the early 2000s they were probably right. Early browser security model was a bit of a mess. The fact that this article is even talked about is a sign of how much better things are.
whizzter 26 minutes ago [-]
I still do "random" browsing in FF with NoScript, that said, I'll acknowledge the frequency of updates of Chrome,etc and years of hardening.
It's not the Bonzi-buddy and driveby-installed IE toolbars wild west of the early 00s.
Espressosaurus 29 minutes ago [-]
It became insane because nothing bloody worked without Javascript some time in the early 2010s.
Like cellphones, javascript became necessary if you want to use webmail, access your bank's website, or whatever.
ThunderSizzle 7 minutes ago [-]
I still run with u matrix though, and most third party requests can be limited, but I no longer have enough patience when a required page doesn't work - I'll just rely on ublock origin to work.
nixosbestos 10 minutes ago [-]
I say this as someone does NOT disable JS in my main browser (because like, I have a job), but also knows a fair bit about why Firefox inside Tails now restarts in some cases...
It's the classic thing. Across every gdmf metric, excluding with "true empathy", no one *gives a fuck* until it affects them, or someone within (1-3) degrees of separatation. And having broad empathy is generally a good way to get yourself labeled/astrocized: both about as obvious "compriate" and obvious "adversary".
throwatdem12311 35 minutes ago [-]
I’m so tired. I think I’m just going to get a job as a garbage man and cancel my internet.
jesse_dot_id 25 minutes ago [-]
There's been a Chrome CVE like every week ever since it came out.
This issue is already fixed in Google Chrome (152.0.7977.83)
azakai 1 hours ago [-]
TFA says
> Type confusion in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.82 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page.
So it was fixed in 152.0.7977.82 (before .83), if I read that right.
anon109 2 hours ago [-]
Is graphene even affected? JIT is disabled in default configurations.
chuckadams 3 hours ago [-]
The release version just now updated to 152.0.7977.83 which has the fix.
fmajid 2 hours ago [-]
I upgraded Vivaldi, which is reporting 152.0.7977.112
2 hours ago [-]
johnnyApplePRNG 15 minutes ago [-]
NIST probably had this one filed and ready to announce years ago
like those news agencies have obituaries of famous old people pre-written
thenewnewguy 2 hours ago [-]
Does anybody have a source for the "actively exploited" part of the HN title?
"CISA maintains the authoritative source of vulnerabilities that have been exploited in the wild."
crtasm 2 hours ago [-]
This line, I think? >This CVE is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
esseph 2 hours ago [-]
"Google has confirmed that an exploit exists in the wild but has not disclosed information about the threat actors, targeted organizations, or attack campaigns while the update is still rolling out."
basilikum 37 minutes ago [-]
For what is this exploited in the wild when it doesn't include a sandbox escape?
Is this chained with n-days?
snorbleck 21 minutes ago [-]
So basically, Edge, Brave and any other browser built on Chromium. Nice.
TZubiri 34 minutes ago [-]
Why is this 8.8?
It's because User Interaction is Required. CVSS 10 would be the case where everyone can be exploited without interaction.
Interestingly the 8.8 is more alert-worthy than the 9.8 and 10 cvss, because there is a need to be alerted of the current security risk, whereas with a cvss 2 vuln, there is nothing to be done by users, only admins.
Terr_ 2 hours ago [-]
As somebody who prefers to browse with JS off whenever possible, there's something absurd about the balance everyone takes for granted between (A) your personal safety against a devastating hack by malicious code and (B) surveillance advertising.
"Sorry, but to enter this shop you need to take one of the used syringes from that pile some dude delivers every day and poke yourself with it."
TZubiri 27 minutes ago [-]
This seems irrelevant as the issue talks about being exploitable with a crafted HTML page, no mention of JS. If true, you would be able to be hit without js enabled.
krackers 22 minutes ago [-]
It mentions a type confusion in V8. Is it possible to trigger that without JS enabled?
The "all chromium versions" part of the title is also misleading, most browser CVEs do not distinguish between "untested lower bound" vs "affects all" (even though it seems like it'd be trivial to bisect).
petra303 3 hours ago [-]
Only a score of 8.8?
teravor 3 hours ago [-]
RCE inside sandbox, so requires chaining with another 0day.
zahlman 3 hours ago [-]
What exactly does "RCE inside sandbox" describe that goes beyond "the webpage can supply arbitrary JavaScript and the JavaScript engine executes it", but is still isolated from the system?
StilesCrisis 1 hours ago [-]
Chrome runs webpages in individual sandbox processes with very low privileges, as a defense-in-depth strategy. It generally requires at least two exploits to actually affect a user--first, get RCE in a sandboxed process, then find a separate vulnerability that lets you escape the sandbox process entirely. For this bug to have actually been used in the wild, there was almost certainly a second bug as well.
jimrandomh 2 hours ago [-]
It means it can execute native code inside the sandbox, as opposed to Javascript. While still sandboxed, this lets it access some parts of the attack surface that JS would not have been able to, some of which may have other exploits that allow escaping the rest of the way.
jnwatson 2 hours ago [-]
It means it can execute arbitrary machine code in the sandbox.
r_lee 2 hours ago [-]
I think people would like to understand what the "sandbox" is here and what isolation does it provide, is it an unprivileged process? something chromium specific? a v8/JS thing? etc.
ranger_danger 2 hours ago [-]
Seems to use OS-specific kernel syscall filtering facilities.
I would assume in this case that there's full renderer control, not just a bypass of the in-process isolation.
r_lee 2 hours ago [-]
great link, thanks
zahlman 2 hours ago [-]
Okay, and why is that more of a security risk than executing arbitrary JavaScript in the sandbox?
arcfour 46 minutes ago [-]
Among other things, JavaScript in the browser has no way to even express "kill PID 1234 on the user's machine" or "list the contents of `C:\Users\Documents` and upload all of the files" or "spawn cmd.exe on the user's machine". How would you even do these things if you could run any JavaScript in the browser? You can't.
However, chrome.exe itself does because it's a native application, as is the sandboxed JavaScript interpreter inside of chrome.exe.
(This is a very oversimplified explanation but I think this is the disconnect people are having)
insanitybit 1 hours ago [-]
Because Javascript theoretically can't just access files on disk. Control over the render would let you do that, if not for the process level sandbox, which constraints things like file access, system, calls, etc.
But the process is still more capable than the VM. The process can talk to other processes via IPC, for example.
That's why you don't go from "javascript -> computer is taken over", instead you go from "javascript -> renderer control -> computer is taken over".
r_lee 2 hours ago [-]
because with proper code exec you can trigger other bugs to escalate beyond the sandbox, whereas with JS you'd have to find a bug to escape from JS to native
can't get a proper ios/Android RCE with just JS code exec
p-e-w 2 hours ago [-]
It can do some things that JS can’t do, such as invalid pointer writes. But you are correct that this doesn’t automatically imply system access.
TacticalCoder 1 hours ago [-]
> It means it can execute arbitrary machine code in the sandbox.
Well which is precisely why we have sandboxes.
To me "executing arbitrary code in the sandbox" is similar to "I don't give a flying fuck for it's what a sandbox is for".
More information is needed. As someone commented: this has to be paired with at least another exploit to make anything remotely useful.
A sandbox is a sandbox. We want to understand how "code running in a sandbox" is "actively exploited".
johnsmith1840 2 hours ago [-]
Memory isolation having one tab or account open on your bank and another on this page does not mean it could leak across the sandbox and steal bank account details but anything inside of your general page content can be lost
20 minutes ago [-]
2 hours ago [-]
TZubiri 28 minutes ago [-]
This doesn't affect the score though, the reason there's 1.2 points less than the max is because there is a Required User Interaction. The user needs to visit a specific html page.
Even with the sandbox protection layer, the rest of the parameters are maxed out.
iririririr 2 hours ago [-]
what is online ad networks for $100, alex
jeremyjh 7 minutes ago [-]
I don't know why this is being downvoted. This is called malvertising and its one of the most significant vectors for exploiting a vulnerability like this. Its happened multiple times over the last two decades.
My read of Google's disclosure is that there is no known escape from the sandbox. I don't agree this would be reported this way just because "user action" like "using web browser" is required. Even if this individual CVE is still an 8.8 there would be a critical threat report of a known chain.
11 minutes ago [-]
colincowardly 2 hours ago [-]
[dead]
anonymousiam 2 hours ago [-]
Just one more reason to never use Chrome. Their removal of MV2 to prevent UBlock Origin from working is another.
fidotron 1 hours ago [-]
Chrome product management is horrible. Chrome software engineering is some of the best ever done.
(And no, I don't use it except for testing).
noir_lord 1 hours ago [-]
I don’t disagree, two or more things can be true at once.
That said I still use Firefox for other reasons.
I simply don’t trust google, I don’t trust Mozilla either but I do trust them more than Google and you do kinda have to have a browser to function in the modern world.
Barbing 48 minutes ago [-]
Of all the reasons to use non-Chromium browsers whenever possible(!), this isn’t really on the list.
According to the Chrome release page (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/09/stable-channel...), Google paid a researcher $1000 for ethically reporting this.
The CVE associated with it (CVE-2026-85046) is already being exploited in the wild. If we put our thinking caps on, how much do you think this vulnerability is actually worth? How much do you think an organization like Google would spend on, for example, AI tokens or compute to detect this internally before it was found and exploited in the wild?
Ethical disclosure is a complicated topic, because researchers shouldn't hold bugs for ransom or demand high payment. But at the same time, if someone submits a critical issue like this, it makes sense to pay them what the bug's actually worth. Why should a researcher be effectively penalized for responsibly telling a vendor instead of selling the bug to a "research firm" or three-letter agency?
It's one thing if you're an open source project maintainer just trying to put something out to the community. The math is a lot different if you're Google.
Further: a vulnerability is probably not worth that much either, even if it's a hypercapable vulnerability, because the grey market buys full enablement kits, not vulnerability information. People making 6 figures on vulnerabilities are selling fully enabled full chain exploit systems, not just intelligence about a sandbox escape.
* They pay for vulnerabilities without reliable exploits (more for vulnerabilities that are demonstrably reliable).
* They don't require you to actually build a reliable exploit chain.
* They pay up front, not in tranches.
* They work with essentially all comers, unlike the grey market, where you're generally subcontracting to sell your first few.
... than Google?
> Selling to Google though you aren't chancing jail time.
Why would you go to jail for selling a vulnerability? It's free speech.
Isn't that a good thing?
> However it is now clear that all bugs that can be found will be found. So this makes a ton of sense.
If Google can find all the bugs nowadays, presumably with AI, why still pay a bug bounty? At least by this logic, bug bounties make less sense now.
Remember that you can sell the same vulnerability to multiple people: it's software you can copy.
$1k is so dumb and the fact we’re discussing auctions is proof (hello, Sundar, what you doing over there?).
Guess this will change after the next e.g. nationwide hospital ransomware by a hacker who publicly laments bounty rates, if the news cycle accommodates the story long enough.
I'd point out that part of the reason the grey and black market pays so well is because it is that type of market. You have to pay people extra to look past their morals and a risk premium against potential reputational and legal consequences.
That said, the gap is probably not just that.
Someone could sell it on the black market, sell it to Google, or just move on with their life and not sell it.
I don't know what this is worth on the black market, maybe I'd be scammed by even trying to sell it. Maybe I don't want to be a bad person. These are all things that go into the prices
In the world where security issues are paid for entirely at market rate, it would also be very important to not use browsers by poor groups because they would be unable to pay for security reports on the market and consequently the browsers would be less secure.
Interesting idea, for sure, but I don't think it lands in a place I want to go since I neither desire stochastic payments nor desire that all browsers should be from large corporations.
Having just a Sandbox RCE is neat, I've got some on my laptop currently, but it's just a piece of the puzzle.
On average, probably not that much. What's the amortized cost of all testing, static analysis, and audit / code review, per "prevented potential bug"?
nothing will change until big tech can no longer rip off security researchers
Why not? Capitalism requires they maximize their value. These profitable companies lay bare at the altar, so they should understand the requirements of their god.
> viewed it as insurance
Of course. Beyond the ethics, the social obligation, sleeping well at night by compensating hardworking people fairly.
“We can’t pay more or we’d have to hire more human reviewers” should never be a massive company’s line of thinking.
in the darkweb, due to crypto, a lot. there is where the $ is, whether it's stealing crypto directly or phishing developers.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3514
It's not the Bonzi-buddy and driveby-installed IE toolbars wild west of the early 00s.
Like cellphones, javascript became necessary if you want to use webmail, access your bank's website, or whatever.
It's the classic thing. Across every gdmf metric, excluding with "true empathy", no one *gives a fuck* until it affects them, or someone within (1-3) degrees of separatation. And having broad empathy is generally a good way to get yourself labeled/astrocized: both about as obvious "compriate" and obvious "adversary".
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases
https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases
Only if you use Nightly wait maybe not.
> Type confusion in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.82 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page.
So it was fixed in 152.0.7977.82 (before .83), if I read that right.
like those news agencies have obituaries of famous old people pre-written
"CISA maintains the authoritative source of vulnerabilities that have been exploited in the wild."
Is this chained with n-days?
It's because User Interaction is Required. CVSS 10 would be the case where everyone can be exploited without interaction.
Interestingly the 8.8 is more alert-worthy than the 9.8 and 10 cvss, because there is a need to be alerted of the current security risk, whereas with a cvss 2 vuln, there is nothing to be done by users, only admins.
"Sorry, but to enter this shop you need to take one of the used syringes from that pile some dude delivers every day and poke yourself with it."
The "all chromium versions" part of the title is also misleading, most browser CVEs do not distinguish between "untested lower bound" vs "affects all" (even though it seems like it'd be trivial to bisect).
Windows: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/HEAD/docs/d...
Linux: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/0e94f26e8/d...
https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8.git/+/refs/heads/mai...
However, chrome.exe itself does because it's a native application, as is the sandboxed JavaScript interpreter inside of chrome.exe.
(This is a very oversimplified explanation but I think this is the disconnect people are having)
But the process is still more capable than the VM. The process can talk to other processes via IPC, for example.
That's why you don't go from "javascript -> computer is taken over", instead you go from "javascript -> renderer control -> computer is taken over".
can't get a proper ios/Android RCE with just JS code exec
Well which is precisely why we have sandboxes.
To me "executing arbitrary code in the sandbox" is similar to "I don't give a flying fuck for it's what a sandbox is for".
More information is needed. As someone commented: this has to be paired with at least another exploit to make anything remotely useful.
A sandbox is a sandbox. We want to understand how "code running in a sandbox" is "actively exploited".
Even with the sandbox protection layer, the rest of the parameters are maxed out.
My read of Google's disclosure is that there is no known escape from the sandbox. I don't agree this would be reported this way just because "user action" like "using web browser" is required. Even if this individual CVE is still an 8.8 there would be a critical threat report of a known chain.
(And no, I don't use it except for testing).
That said I still use Firefox for other reasons.
I simply don’t trust google, I don’t trust Mozilla either but I do trust them more than Google and you do kinda have to have a browser to function in the modern world.
It can’t trick Canva into letting you use the color picker, or otherwise enable it, can it - if someone happens to know?
(What a dumb feature to be locked to the Googlesphere.)