> The attacker used social engineering to induce Drift Security Council multisig signers into pre-signing transactions that appeared routine but carried hidden authorisations.
So much for the "Security Council". What an embarrassment to be in a team/org like that and fail your most basic duty which would be "look at what you sign".
lokar 42 minutes ago [-]
That was inevitable, and all designs like that will eventually yield the same outcome.
The people who should be embarrassed are the ones who thought having a group of humans routinely review (possibly complex) transactions for correctness, with no ability to undo/revert the outcome, was a good idea.
lokar 38 minutes ago [-]
Also, how could one reasonably disprove that the signers were not in on the scam?
bombcar 26 minutes ago [-]
That’s the best part, you can’t!
nradov 4 minutes ago [-]
It's always entertaining to see worthless idiots lose money on an obvious scam like cryptocurrency. Ha ha. Although in this case it seems that North Koreans might have ended up with actual valuable fiat currency, which is unfortunate.
vessenes 38 minutes ago [-]
The multisig UI/UX is a real and long term difficulty for any governance council. "Please sign this opaque transaction with binary data, it represents our agreement. I promise." For a while maybe ten years ago I worked with MakerDAO on this problem - at the time the idea was a separate auditor for proposed transactions.
This general attack pattern is: get a lender with good collateral to call your bad collateral good, then swap collaterals, and it's a known and bad attack vector; the ongoing tension between innovation / speed and caution continues.
There's probably a flash-loan multiplier angle here for an even worse attack; I'm imagining chaining a liquidity change in the trusted price oracle for the CVT token in the middle of the swapping. Anyway, upshot - don't loan against North Korean attack tokens. Put it on the list.
simonw 52 minutes ago [-]
So this is the end of the Drift project, right?
Back at the top of the crypto hype cycle I wouldn't be surprised to see a project survive even a situation like this one, but now that the hype has died down is it still possible to come back from a loss of this magnitude?
45 minutes ago [-]
youniverse 7 minutes ago [-]
What a nice retirement fund!
estetlinus 50 minutes ago [-]
> The funds were used to deploy CarbonVote Token (CVT), a completely fictitious asset
Crypto calling out other cryptos, made me giggle
rvnx 33 minutes ago [-]
+ "ZachXBT publicly criticised Circle for not freezing the stolen USDC during the bridge"
calling for this, when the whole concept is to avoid government control
haakon 17 minutes ago [-]
Backed stablecoins aren't some anarchistic anti-government thing; they are highly regulated and will lose access to their banking if they don't follow the rules – rules which require them to freeze coins in cases of crime.
If you want to show a middle finger to government there are cryptocurrencies for that, but USD stablecoins with centralized backing is not it.
Their CEO should serve prison time for being so incompetent but hey c-levels almost never get punished which is sad.
53 minutes ago [-]
Overpower0416 57 minutes ago [-]
What kind of DeFi protocol has super power private keys to alter the protocol just like that? And no timelock. Seriously? What a joke
KK7NIL 49 minutes ago [-]
Seems to be very standard now a days as projects seek to do things that can't be done fully on-chain.
You'd think they'd take a step back and ask "why is this even a token then?".
Overpower0416 41 minutes ago [-]
All changes should be voted upon no matter if onchain or offchain. After that there should be a timelock, so people that don't agree with the vote to pull their assets if they want to. The only power these private keys should have is to pause the market if there is a major bug or exploit.
lokar 40 minutes ago [-]
It's a token so they can make $
maipen 36 minutes ago [-]
It took a long time until we got real digital money, Bitcoin.
But all these new protocols want to do stuff at the expense of trustlesssness.
verdverm 43 minutes ago [-]
Is public-permissionless just a bad fundamental?
andxor 52 minutes ago [-]
Hyperliquid.
yieldcrv 47 minutes ago [-]
this is a beautiful attack, the way that multisig signers were compromised with innocuous signatures in advance, without really compromising private keys
from the pre-funding to a virgin address, to the bundler, to the exit strategy to decentralized assets
to the protocols exposed but functioning perfectly under the stress test - props to Jupiter! - and the optional insurance protocols functioning decently, all while people point fingers at Circle for their bridge working perfectly, it's not even clear what people want them to do specifically! All of these aspects of web3 are working great, and it's easy for a cynic that only sees these headlines to miss that
inspirational, great place to build
rvba 49 minutes ago [-]
It feels like main purpose of those various coins are scams. Either classic pump and dump, or advanced ones based on complex interactions.
solguarddev 1 hours ago [-]
[flagged]
fred_is_fred 1 hours ago [-]
[dead]
Rendered at 19:12:28 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) with Vercel.
So much for the "Security Council". What an embarrassment to be in a team/org like that and fail your most basic duty which would be "look at what you sign".
The people who should be embarrassed are the ones who thought having a group of humans routinely review (possibly complex) transactions for correctness, with no ability to undo/revert the outcome, was a good idea.
This general attack pattern is: get a lender with good collateral to call your bad collateral good, then swap collaterals, and it's a known and bad attack vector; the ongoing tension between innovation / speed and caution continues.
There's probably a flash-loan multiplier angle here for an even worse attack; I'm imagining chaining a liquidity change in the trusted price oracle for the CVT token in the middle of the swapping. Anyway, upshot - don't loan against North Korean attack tokens. Put it on the list.
Back at the top of the crypto hype cycle I wouldn't be surprised to see a project survive even a situation like this one, but now that the hype has died down is it still possible to come back from a loss of this magnitude?
Crypto calling out other cryptos, made me giggle
calling for this, when the whole concept is to avoid government control
If you want to show a middle finger to government there are cryptocurrencies for that, but USD stablecoins with centralized backing is not it.
You'd think they'd take a step back and ask "why is this even a token then?".
But all these new protocols want to do stuff at the expense of trustlesssness.
from the pre-funding to a virgin address, to the bundler, to the exit strategy to decentralized assets
to the protocols exposed but functioning perfectly under the stress test - props to Jupiter! - and the optional insurance protocols functioning decently, all while people point fingers at Circle for their bridge working perfectly, it's not even clear what people want them to do specifically! All of these aspects of web3 are working great, and it's easy for a cynic that only sees these headlines to miss that
inspirational, great place to build